Introduction
Although there is an ever gr owing number of studies on t he Europeanization of institutional structures, politics and polic ies in the Member States (and even bey ond the latter), analyses of the domestic impact of the European Union (EU) so far have been characterized by a relatively limited focu s on the side of the dependent variable.
Scholars were primarily in terested in two aspects: (1) the degree of EU-induced changes in national arrangements and (2) the ex tent to which these changes lead to the convergence of national structures, inst itutions or polic ies. By contrast, no systematic studies exist which investigate whether EU-induced changes coincide with an expansion or dismantling of domestic arrangements in varying policy sectors. In other words, we know quite a lot about the degr ee to which Europeaniz ation trigge rs domestic change as well as whether and under which c onditions it entails policy convergence, but our knowledge on the direction of national policy responses is surprisingly limited. Consequently, in this articl e we pose th e following research questions:
To what extent and under which conditions does the EU influenc e the establishment of additional domestic institut ions or polic ies? In which constellations, by contrast, can we expect oppos ite scenarios that coin cide with a weak ening or even complete abolishment of the respective arrangements at the level of the Member States?
It is hence the objective of this paper to s hed some light on thes e so far neglected consequences of Europeanization. In so doing, we restrict our analytical focus to the conditions under whic h the regul atory activities of the EU lead to the expansion or dismantling of policy arrangements in the member states. We measure these patterns of expansion and dismantling on the basis of policy outputs, i.e. policies adopted by a government, by distinguishing between three dimensions: (1) the policy level, (2) the instrument level, and (3) the level of ins trument settings. At the most general level, that is t he mere presence of a policy, change can either happen through the addition of new policies or the abolishment of existing ones. At the subsequent level, policy change im plies the addition of new policy instruments or the abolishment of existing ones. Finally, in terms of instrument settings, policy change is measured by the degree to which regulatory standards are increased or reduced.
We argue that the extent to whic h EU requirements lead to an expansion or dismantling of national policy arr angements is crucially affected by the respective governance logic underlying the regulator y activities at the European lev el. In this vein, we differentiate between three particular gov ernance patterns: (1) complianc e with EU rules, (2) competition betw een national administrative systems to achiev e EU requirements, and (3) communication between regulatory agents across national levels arranged in an EU legal or ins titutional framework (see Holzinger and Knill 2004, 2005; Knill and Lenschow 2005; Holzinger et al. 2008 ).
The article is structured as follows. In a first step, we give an overview of the theoretical achiev ements of E uropeanization research in order to show how the arguments made in this paper advance our understanding of t he national policy im plications of EU regulations. Second, we turn to the operationalization of our dependent variable, namely policy expansion and dis mantling. Th ird, we elaborate on the three governance patterns and dev elop hypotheses on national policy change, which we also illustrate empirically. In the final s ection we present our conclu sion and point to open questions for future research.
State of the art
It is widely accepted that the EU affects domestic politics, policies and administrative structures. For exploring how the EU matte rs, Europeanization research has focused on adaptation pressures and the implement ation of European directives an d regulations (see e.g. Knill 1997 Knill , 2001 Bulmer and Burc h 2000; Radaelli, 20 00; Cowles et al. 2001; Bulmer and Leques ne 2002; Héritier et al. 2001; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002; Olsen 2002; Börzel and Risse 2003) . Thereby, the "goodness of fit"
between European policy requir ements and existi ng institutions at the national level received m ost attention for explaining the differential impact of the EU on member states (Mastenbroek 2005 (Mastenbroek : 1109 There are, however, some related concepts from which theories of policy expansio n and dismantling can borrow. In this contex t, the literature on the determinants of policy termination, which came about in the 1970s in the United States, represents a useful sour ce (see Behn 1978; deLeon 1978; Brewer 1978; Daniels 1997 Daniels , 2001 Geva-May 2001) . Yet, these studies failed to open up a consolidated field of research. In part, this can be explained by missing attempts of linking up termination studies wit h related research programs, namely theories of policy change (see e.g. Howlett and Bennett 1992; Krause 1994; Ho wlett and Ramesh 1998) . But more importantly, the literature model ed the dependent variable "te rmination" in a too rigorous manner -it was as ei ther coded as complete termination or non-termination without acc ounting for gradual differences in the intensity of policy termination phenomena. In additio n, the possib ility of opp osite directions of policy change, namely policy expansion, was completely neglected. As a consequence, the rare observation of such ev ents of complete termination led Pet ers (1982, 1985) to conclude that studying the determinants of policy termination would be irrelevant (see also Bauer 2006) .
The second related research br anch is about the explanation of "race to the bottom"
and "race to the top" phenomena, respectively. Both predict ions stem from the theories of regulatory compet ition, which are based on ec onomic theories of systems competition or regulatory competition (Tiebout 1956; Oates and Schwab 1988) . Rac e to the bottom dynamics occur when policy changes adopted in one jurisdiction create incentives for other jurisdiction to adopt similar changes. The lo wering of regulations in one jurisdiction incr eases the costs to others of mai ntaining high standards, causing the affected jurisdictions to follow suit in their own polic ies. This argument has generally been applied to capi tal taxation, environmental regulations, and labor standards. With respect to the race to t he top dynamics, nati onal governments upgrade their own regulation to protect their firms against foreign competitors (Scharpf 1997; Holzinger 2002 ). This can occur if national regulations serve as a certificate of superior quality that is rewarded by t he market, e.g. with internationa l banking regulation (Kapstein 1992 (Kapstein , 1994 . However, races to the bottom or the top are rather associated with economic globalization than Europeanization. Thus, they only marginally serve as a point of reference for deriving theoretical predictions about the implications of Europeanization for policy change.
In light of these considerations, we believe that theorizing the direction of EU-induced policy change is a seminal u ndertaking, enabling further progress in Europeanization research as well as s tudies of policy termination and policy change. In this vein, we can integrate the three research progr ammes for generating a more coherent theoretical model and filling the gap in the research record.
Operationalization
As already mentioned in the previous sect ion, the core problem with policy termination studies consisted in the crude measur ement of the dependent variable. In order to increase our analytical leverage on phenomena of policy dismantling and expansion, we need to further differentiate the the concept of policy change in order to be able to accurately measure the direction of national policy change?
To this end, we, first, restrict ourselves to the analysis of po licy outputs, i.e. different kinds of legislation adopted by a government. We do not consider policy outcomes, because they are usually affected by a number of intervening v ariables, a nd henc e can only be indirectly related to the c ausal mechanis ms triggering domestic polic y change (Holzinger and Kn ill 2004: 30) . In consequenc e, we apply a "positiv e" rather than normative approach to assessing poli cy change. We measure changes in the breadth and intensity of stat e involvement rather than judging the normative consequences of these changes -the latter is main ly the object of evaluation research and reaches well beyond the scope of this article. third-order change is related to the presence of a certain policy (see Howlett and Ramesh 2003: 146) .
On the bas is of this typology, we measur e expansion and disman tling with regard to the setting of policy instrument s by the extent to which, for instance, regulatory standards or tax rates are either increased or decreased. In this context, the characterization of changes in ins trument settings depends on the nature of the single item. With tax rates, for instance, a lowering of t he setting implies policy dis mantling, whereas with environmental pollution standards the lowering of the maximum permissible limits would be interpreted as policy expansion since it incr eases the overall level of environmental protection. In te rms of the instrum ent level, we meas ure the ext ent to which expansion and dismantling occurs by the addition of new policy instruments or the abolishment of existing ones . Given t hat an authority-based instrument is replaced by a market-based one, we would not interpret this as policy dismantling bu t rather as substitution and before the backgr ound of our particular analytical researc h question as the "preservation" of the stat us quo. Finally, we as sess expa nsion and dismantling with regar d to the policy goals by evaluating whether new polic ies were added or existing ones became abolished within the context of European integration. The distinc tion between policy presence, inst ruments and settings also allows us to formulate more precise expectations about the likelihood of policy change in terms of dismantling and expansion. Changes related to the policy dimension refer to the most abstract dimension. Since mo difications of entire policies imply a departure from dominant and institutionally strongly entrenched ideas of how to perceive and resolve certain political problems, we presume that this dimension is most unlik ely to change substantially. By contrast, the instruments and their settings as rather concrete aspects of policy outputs should be more prone to cha nge. In fact, we would argue that this is es pecially the case for changes in the setting s since they can be achieved within existing instruments and policies (see deLeon 1978; Hall 1993).
European Governance Patterns
In the following we classify three basic governance patterns of how European policymaking might affect the expansion or di smantling of domestic regulatory arrangements. European policies might be very dem anding and prescribe a concrete institutional model for domestic adapt ation ( compliance) (1); they mi ght be confined to changing domestic opportunity stru ctures (via the mechanism of regulatory competition) (2); or, in their "weakest" form, be prim arily directed at changing the beliefs and In developing our argument we focus espec ially on the behavior of national bureaucracies which are the most c entral actors when it com es to the implementation of E U policies at the domestic level. We argue that they tend to follow certain general rationalities in responding to these inputs, making polic y change in a certain direction (dismantling versus expansion) more or less probable. Or put in other words, these three modes of governance provide the mi cro-foundation for our analytical framework. Elucidating the rationale behind the behav ior of the relevant actors is a prerequisite for arriving at complete explanations (Coleman 1987) .
It is thus the prime aim of the fol lowing sections to generate hypotheses on the relationship between these modes of European governance and domestic policy change as well as to provide empirical examples fr om different areas of EU regulatory policy.
The empirical illustrations are not intended as systematic empirical tests of the hypotheses to be formulated, but rather as a way of evaluating the plausibility of our reasoning.
Compliance
In its most explicit form European legisl ation may trigger domes tic change by prescribing concrete requirement s with which member states must comply, i.e. the EU prescribes a policy model to which domes tic arrangements have to be adjusted. Accordingly, member states hav e only limited institutional discretion when de ciding the concrete arrangements for compliance wit h European requirem ents, but have to bring domestic arrangements in line with a policy model which is exactly defined at the supranational level.
European governanc e by complianc e is partic ularly pronounced in policies of socalled pos itive integration, including, for ins tance, env ironmental protection, health and safety at work, consumer pr otection, and sections of so cial policy. In t his case, Community polic ies ar e explicitly directed at reshaping existing domestic regulatory arrangements. The complianc e with Europ ean legislation hence typically requir es changes in the national policy status quo, referring to the policies present in the member states (e.g. regulations on the freedom of access to administrative documents), the respective policy inst ruments (environmental standards for example) as well as spe cific instrument settings (such as maximum levels for automobile exhaust emissions).
As there is often a close link bet ween prescribed policy choices and necess ary institutional arr angements (regulatory styles a nd structures) that are needed for the proper implementation of t he E uropean regulations, poli cy com pliance an d institutional change are strongly related to one anot her. In the Europeani zation literature, there is a broad cons ensus that the general response pattern s is characterized by a persistence-driven orientation of national bureaucracies who attempt to meet the policy obligations while minimizi ng their institutional adapta tion cost (see e.g. Knill and Lenschow 1998; Börz el and Riss e 2000). T his approach is facilit ated by their rather autonomous position in finding appropriate ways towards po licy complianc e, as the central focus underlying the compliance mode is on the formal and timely compliance with the EU requirements, not explicitly valuing the search for most efficient and effective paths towards solving a given polic y problem. Hence, it is keeping the bureaucracies insulated from outside pressu re to engage in extensive administrative optimization efforts. Conseque ntly, national adjustments wil l primarily follow the pattern of administrative self-adaptation. Both the literature on bureaucratic politics and more generally that on organiza tional behaviour suggest that thi s administrative rationality typically coincides with rather in cremental and gradual adjustments of established routines and procedures (Lindblom 1959; March and Olsen 1989) .
What expectations follow fr om these considerations for likely directions of EUinduced policy changes? To answer this question, we first have to clarify the assumptions under lying our reasoning. First, we tr eat national governments as rational and unitary actors, with governments possessing defined policy pref erences, which they try to realize in order to maximiz e their benefits. Second, we as sume that regulation is costly -the costs should be higher fo r the change of entir e polic ies and then gradually decrease for modifications of poli cy instruments and policy settin gs. This assumption makes the prevalenc e of the status quo higher for the policy dimension than for the other two dimensions. Third, we assum e that compliance benefits exceed regulation costs. Assumi ng that under this European governance pattern policy change is associated with a net benefit explains why it happens at all. Similar scenarios apply to many other directives in the fi eld of environmental and social policy, such as the directive on parental leave (see Falkner et al. 2002) .
In this context, it is rather common that respective policy innovations in one or two pioneer states provide an in spiring starting point for t he EU Commission to suggest similar measures at the European level, hence implying the intr oduction of new policies in many member states while leav ing the status quo fo r the pioneers unchanged (Héritier et al. 1996; Andersen and Liefferi nk 1997) . At the general level of policy presence, preservation of the domestic stat us quo or policy expansion are hence the scenarios that are logically possible. By c ontrast, it is hardly conceivable that the adoption of a certain policy at the level of the EU requires the replacement or even the abolis hment of existing domestic polic ies. For instance, the adoption of a Euro-pean polic y on air pollution from industrial plants does not demand that member states give up their existing policies in this or related fields.
Turning to the dimens ion of instruments, th e expected pattern is rather similar, although her e a "clash" emerging from the incompatibility of European requir ements and national arrangements is more likely. Mo re precisely, two scenarios are conceivable: expansion and substituti on, with the latter case impl ying the preservation of the status quo according to our definition of policy dismantling and expansion..
In the first constellation of expansion, the EU defines policy instruments that are not only new to the domestic context, but also do not interfere with national equivalentsi.e. different instruments t hat serve similar policy object ives as those underlying the respective EU policy.
In the field of environmental policy, for instance, it is ev ident that the Member States strive to put forward their national regulat ory concepts at the Eu ropean level, whic h leads to a relatively large range of different r egulatory instruments, which span from substantial set limits (qualit y and emission limits) to purely procedural ins truments (information and participation rights) (Hériti er et al. 1996) . This broad range of differ- Turning to the level of instrument settings , all three scenarios of expansion, dismantling and preservation of the status quo are theoretically conceivable. However, since the EU us ually defines minimum standards (e.g. air and water quality standards) which the Member States can exceed at the national level, policy expansion seems more likely than dismantling. In fact, dismantling could only hap pen when the EU prescribes total harmonization with comm on standards that lower previous national approaches. But also in these cases, a dismantling scenario is somehow unrealistic as the EU generally reaches total harmonizati on only on rather high lev els that rarely pose problems of compliance across countries.
Hypothesis 1: Policy change under the compliance mode
These considerations lead us t o the follo wing expectations wi th regard to policy change at the level of policy presence, the instruments dimension, and the settings level, in constellations in which EU governance is based on the compliance mode.
Policy presence
For the policy presence dimension, we expect no policy dismantling.
For the policy presence dimension, we expect policy expansion, if the Member States have no policies in place that correspond to those prescribed by the Commission.
For the policy presence dimension, we expect the prevalence of the status quo, if the Member States have polic ies in place whic h correspond to those prescribed by the Commission.
Policy instruments
For the policy instruments dimension, we expect no dismantling.
For the policy instruments dimension, we ex pect expansion, if the prescribed instruments are not present at t he domestic level and if these instruments are compatible with domestic regulatory arrangements.
For the policy instruments dimension, we expect the prevalence of the status quo, either if the EU prescribes the substitution of existing instruments or if EU instruments are highly incompatible with domestic regulatory a rrangements and are hence not properly transposed.
Policy settings
For the settings dimension, we expect poli cy dismantling, if the EU applies total harmonization and if the prescribed settings are less stringent than the respective domestic standards.
For the settings dimension, we expect pol icy expansion, if t he EU either applies minimum harmonization or total harmonizati on with a prescribed setting that is above the respective national standards.
For the settings dimension, we expect the pr evalence of the status quo, if the EU applies total harmonization which corresponds to the level of the respective national standards.
Competition
The influence of EU regulatory policy on national institutions is less direct in the case of governance by competition. This approach implies only limited legally-binding requirements for domestic institut ional change. Rather its ma in purpose is to promote and stimulate the optimiz ation of institutional arrang ements in the member states within a general framework set on the EU-level . Pressure for institutional adjustment thus basic ally emerges from the need to rearrange and redesign national arrangements in order to enhance thei r effectiveness for achieving c ertain, politically-defined objectives (such as the increas e of foreign direct investment or the reduction of unemployment) in comparison to the performanc e of other member states (Oates and Schwab 1988) . Whilst European policies thus pose potential c hallenges for domestic institutions, they do not prescribe any dist inctive institutional model of how the new institutional equilibrium should actually l ook but leave the member states broad discretion for institutiona l design. T heir coercive impact is confined to the definition of legally-binding "rules of the game" member states have to comply with (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002) .
Examples of EU governance being based on the competition mode can be found in particular in market-making policies of t he EU (negative integration). These policies basically exclude certain optio ns from the range of national policy choices , rather than positively prescribing di stinctive institut ional models to be enacted at the national level. Their impact is generally rest ricted to the abolition of domestic administrative arrangements which di stort the functioning of t he Common Market, such as national regulations protecting domestic industrial se ctors against foreign competition.
In contrast with the complianc e mode, now the rationale behind institutional change is systems' competition, impl ying that there are certain re-distributional effects between Member States that ar e affected by the comparativ e performance of national regulatory practices and institutions. Cons equently, rather than se curing institutional persistence the basic focus is on institutiona l effects such as the impact of certain regulatory arrangements on the competitive position of t he national indust ry within the common market. Differing taxation system s in the Member States, fo r instance, could trigger moves of capital and investment between countries bearing far-reaching consequences for national tax revenues, t he overall economic development and the level of employment. Accordingly, there is an enhanc ed potential for societal mobilization and politicization in favor of institutional change. This potential implies that the bureaucracy is no longer in an autonomous positio n when adjusting national arrangements to European requir ements. Instead, bureaucratic behavior becomes highly contingent on the pref erences of and the strategic interaction between political leaders. Th e role of the bureaucr acy in inst itutional reform will th us be more instrumental and can more easily be transformed "from outside" (Knight 1992 ).
What do these considerations imply for EU -induced policy change? In this context, our theoretical considerations rest on the above-made assumption on costs related to regulation, implying th at the effects of competitive pr essures are different for the different policy dimensions under investigation (policy pres ence, in struments, and settings).
While we generally expect more fundamental chang es to dom estic policies as it is the case under the complianc e m ode, our expectations vary in light of the different dimensions under investigati on. For the dimension of policy presence, to begin with, we expect that national a rrangements remain largely unaffected, hence implying the preservation of the status quo. This can be traced to the fa ct that E U policies do not require the abolition of complete polic ies but only of those regulat ory arrangements that entail restriction to t he realization of the Common Ma rket. In other words, Member States are potentially required to abo lish certain instruments and -induced by competitive pressures -might face incentiv es to change instrument setting s rather than abolishing or introducing complete policies.
Turning to the dimension of instruments, there is a high likelihood that the EU triggers domestic dismantling. Dismantling is driven by two factors. On the one hand, Member
States are legally obliged to abolish such instruments that are in contradiction with the objective of market liberal ization. In particular, Mem ber States are no longer allowed to rely on meas ures such as import rest rictions or tariffs in order to protect the competitive position of their industries. This can be illu strated by EU effects on alcohol policy of the Nordic countries, i.e. Fi nland, Norway, and Sweden. Before EU accession, in these countries the import, expor t, wholesale, and retail trade in alcoho l was governed by state monopolies. This proc eeding was motivated by the overriding aim to reduce alcohol related harm in the society. By accepting the acquis communautaire, however, the Nordic countries had also accepted Article 16 of the E uropean Economic Area Agreement, which obliged the contracting parties to ensure that state monopolies of commercial character would be adjusted so that no discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exist. Accordingly, the s tate monopolies were conflicting with the EU requirem ents and had to be abolished (Ugland 1997) . Even though the Nordic countries struggled hard to maintain their previous regulations, the Eu ropean Commission detect ed a source of in-consistency in relation to the contrast between the monopolies' domestic and foreign activities. Some of these activities and practices were clearly discriminatory and could not be justified with re ference to health and soc ial policy considerations. They could instead be regarded as being motiva ted by purely commercial and ec onomic interests. As a result, the countriespartially -abolis hed the state monopolies .
Thus, the EU certainly had an important effe ct on the dismantling of this particular policy (Graver 2002 ).
On the other hand, instrument di smantling is likely to emerge from competitive pres- States to redesign their regulatory arrangem ents for replac ing regulatory burdens on domestic industries. In light of these pressures, the administration could not cling into existing arrangements but functioned as an in strument for implementing these political decisions.
These reforms entailed the complete terminat ion of instruments that were incompatible with the aims of international compet itiveness of the national transport industry.
This conc erned, for example, programmes to fix maximum or minimum prices for transport services, which were terminated in the Member States with an interventionist regulatory tradition (e.g. Germany or Italy). Furthermore, instruments in the area of market access control were also dismantl ed: quantity-based licence restrictions were eliminated. Today, the only prerequisite for access is the fulfilmen t of qualitative access requir ements (demonstrati ng the reliability of the firms). The dev elopments in
Italy also demonstrate that these extensive forms of policy termination occ urred despite numerous veto points and the high resistance of the national transport industry.
With regard to the settings dimension, the literature on regulatory competition and the related concepts of "races to the bottom" and "races to the top", respectively, indicate that both policy dismantling and expansion are theoret ically feasible options . In this context, a distinction is often made bet ween product and production proce ss standards is helpful (see e.g. Scharpf 1996 Scharpf , 1997 . Process standards are generally associated with a race to the bottom scenar io as a stricter regulatory standard presumably raises the costs of production. Henc e, if competition refe rs to the re gulation of process standards, we can either expect that no policy change occurs for securing the -even disadvantageous -level of producti on costs, or policy dismantling is likely to take place.
The theoretical expec tations are, by contrast, less homogeneous for product standards. Most important in this context is the extent to which high-r egulating countries are able to factually enforce stricter standar ds. If it is possible to erect exc eptional trade barri ers, as for example f or health or environmental reasons under EU and WTO rules, a race to the top c an be expected (Scharpf 1997; Vogel 1995) . In accordance with this logic, we make a fourth assu mption, stating that in case of product standards harmonisation benefit s surmount regulation costs. This assumption abut the ordering of t he payoffs allows us to for mulate more precise -and therefore more easily falsifiable -expectations about whet her expansion, dismantling or the maintenance of t he status quo is likely once com petitive pressures are present. Moreover, despite competitiveness pressures, national regulations could be kept as a c ertificate of superior quality that is rewarded by t he market. In consequenc e, we should either expect the preservation of the status quo, or policy expansion.
The German beer purity law ( Reinheitsgebot) serves as an exce llent example for elucidating this logic. Basically, this law only allows four ingredients in the beveragewater, hops, barley, and yeast -which means that foreign compet itors that used additives in their products faced problems in entering the German market. In 1987, the European Court of Justice ru led against the German beer puri ty law, allowing ingredients bey ond the aforement ioned four. This sentence has, however, " not affected traditional policy legacies or preferences, nor has it altered German beer drinking habits" (Schmidt 2001: 13) . The German brew eries continued to apply the purity law and did not "relax" this particular product standard by permitting t he use of additives -even vis-à-vis increasing c ompetition pre ssure. In fact, a number of foreign beer producers -albeit voluntarily -adhered to the beer purity rule for those products destined for the German market.
We can also observe dismantling, i.e. an ongoing lowering, with regard to corporation and inc ome tax levels in the Member St ates, which stems fr om European system competition for mobile capital and foreign direct investment (Devereux et al. 2002; Ganghof 2005) . As far as the harmoni zation of corporation taxes is concerned, the issue has been debated by the Commission for almost 30 y ears, but rather than a legally-binding instrument, the latest initia tive has taken the f orm of a politic ally agreed Code of Conduct. Henc e, no formal appr oximation of tax rates is foreseen (Patterson and Martínez Serrano 2003) . This is also reflected by the figures, whic h show a steady decline from rates of ar ound 50 per cent in 1985 to rates between 30-40 percent in 1995, with Finl and and Sweden displaying the most dramatic falls (see Tanzi 1 996 ). Yet it is still d isputed whether this develo pment is consistent with the scenario of a race to the bottom or merely a "levelling off" or "race to the middle" (Hobson 2003) . Nonetheless, we can to a ce rtain extent explain the dismantling of tax levels by the absence of European tax coordination, whic h is completely in line with our argument.
Finally, the literature on t he policy change implications for product standards due to competition pressures points to endogenous factors, which might stand in the way of lowering national standards and tax rates , e. g. the number of veto player s, institutional opportunity structures and the strengt h of interest organizations (Swank and Steinmo 2002; Holzinger 2002) . One should also take into consideration, as Ganghof (2005: 11) emphasizes, that such structural limitations for potential policy dismantling are becoming less significant, the greater t he system competition is -which has also been illustrated by the Eu ropean road haulage policy. Su mmarizing theoretical arguments up, we can specify t he following hypothesis on the relationship between European governance by competition and policy change.
Hypothesis 2: Policy change under the competition mode
If European governance is bas ed on the co mpetition mode, we have the f ollowing expectations with regard to policy change at the level of policy presence, the instruments dimension, and the settings level.
Policy presence
For the policy presence dimension, we ex pect neither policy dis mantling nor expansion but the preservation of the status quo.
Policy instruments
For the policy instruments di mension, we expect neither policy expansion nor the preservation of the status quo, but policy dismantling as a result of legal and competitive pressures.
Policy settings
For the set tings dimension, we expect di smantling of process st andard lev els as a result of competitive pressures.
For the settings dimension, we expect eith er expansion or dism antling of product standard levels as a result of competitive pressures.
Communication
The third mode of European governance refers to the way in which communicatio n and information exchange lead to domestic policy change. Communication between
Member States aims at accomplishing two obj ectives. Firstly, it stimulates mutual learning between national policy -makers through the exchange of information. Secondly, it pursues the development and promotion of innovative regulatory models and "best practice". Thus, the underlying idea is to foster voluntary forms of policy-transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000) and cross-nati onal less on-drawing (Rose 1991) . Again there are no legally-bi nding prescriptions of institutio nal models of compliance, leaving broad leeway for interpretation and adj ustment to domestic conditions (see Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002; Knill and Lenschow 2005) .
In terms of domestic policy change, we ar gue that now the dom inating logic underlying the behavior of national bureaucracies is about legit imizing existing domestic arrangements within a transnational discourse. In order to gain legitimacy or to prevent its loss, act ors adapt t hose arrangements which are most wide-s pread in the organizational environment, leading to isomor phism (DiMaggio and Po well 1991). Analytically this striving for legitimacy is distinct from the persistence-or performance-driven rationalities of the two former modes of governance. It implie s a higher responsiveness to dominant discourses as well as a di sposition to flex ible and far-reaching re-forms of existing arrangement if these are perceived as helpful for securing the survival of the institution. T he pre-condition f or this legitimacy-driven rationality is the embeddedness of national bure aucrats and policy-makers in transnation al expert networks implying the presence of "transnat ional scrutiny". In consequenc e, we c an expect more dynamic adjustments, which are directed by the transnational acceptance of the emerging design.
Empirical s tudies from diffusion research also point to other characteristics of these processes. Firstly, the higher the number of countries adopting a certain approach, the more likely it bec omes that the search for legitimacy results in domestic polic y change (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Meyer et al. 1997) . Secondly, the individual probability of adaptation particularly increases when cultural or geog raphical "neighbour- The concrete design of the OMC varies from policy field to policy field, some emphasizing infor mation exc hange (e.g. pensions and health) others building up stronger adaptation pressure through cross-national and Commission peer reviews (e.g., employment and to a lesser extent also social inclusion).
What are the consequences from these consider ations for EU-induc ed policy change? Generally we expect that the desire of being compat ible with internationally dominant policy models stimulates policy change in one particular direction: policy expansion. This expectation stems from the nature of OMC pr ocesses, which is mainly marked by setting benchmarks, go als, and minimum standards which can easily be exceeded at the national level.
An eluc idating example for the communica tion mode realiz ed via the applic ation of OMC is provided by t he Europe an Employ ment Strategy ( EES). The EES emerged from a crisis in social policy that came to a head in the mid-1990s with tremendously high unemployment levels in most EU countries. The overall g oal of the strategy is to maintain the European Soc ial Model by reforming it through a nu mber of measures:
(1) higher employment participation; (2) more active unemployment systems; (3) more skills ; (4) more employme nt intensiv e growth; ( 5) fewer o bstacles to lo w skill work; (6) fl exibility wit h security; (7) smaller companies and ent repreneurship; (8) gender equality.
In response to these dimensio ns of EES, several Member States realized changes with existing national employment policy arrangements, which resulted from cognitive shifts by incorporating EU concepts and categories into domestic debates, expos ing policy makers to new approaches, and pressi ng them to reconsid er long-established but increas ingly count erproductive policies (Z eitlin 2007: 5) . Re markably, in some
Member States EES has b een used as a persuas ive t ool to implement polic y changes in areas c haracterized by a la ck of consensus at the national leve l (Szyszczak 2006: 496) . At the policy level, many countries implemented new labor market policies, e.g. preventative and acti ve unemploy ment polic ies. "Preventative" measures refer the issue of long-term or permanent unemployment by ensuring that workers who lose th eir jobs maintain the ir skills an d willin gness to reenter the job market. Active polic ies involve training, subsidies for the hiring of the unemployed, public works programs, and job search a ssistance (Trubek and M osher 2001: 12) . At the level of instruments, Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal introduced part-time work.
And with regard to the settings dimension, t he Netherlands increased their target for female employment to 65 percent (Eur opean Commission 2002: 23-25) . From these considerations we der ive the following hypothesis on t he relationship between European governance by communication and policy change.
Hypothesis 3: Policy change under the communication mode
If European governance is based on the communication mode, we have the following expectations with regard to policy change at the level of policy presence, the instruments dimension, and the settings level.
Policy presence
For the policy presence dimension, we expe ct policy expansion, if the policy innovation is not present in the Member States yet.
For the policy presence dimension, we expect the prevalence of the status quo, if the policy innovation is already present in the Member States.
Policy instruments
For the instruments dimension, we expect no policy dismantling.
For the instruments dimension, we expec t policy expansion if the propos ed instruments are not present in the Member States yet.
For the ins truments dimension, we expect t he prevalence of the status quo, if the proposed instruments are already present in the Member States.
Policy settings
For the settings dimension, we expect no policy dismantling.
For the settings dimension, we expect pol icy expansion if the proposed set tings do not correspond to the national level.
For the settings, we expect that prevalence of the status quo, if the proposed settings correspond to the national level.
Conclusio n
In this article we scrutinized a so far not explicitly analyzed phenomenon -the impact of European polic ies on national policy exp ansion and dismantling. Our main finding is that the activities of the EU tri gger domestic policy changes that move in both directions. There is no clear and unambigu ous direction of nat ional policy developments that is induc ed by Eu ropeanization effects, Notwit hstanding this general finding, the likelihood of different directions of policy change varies not only with the specific governance mode underlying EU policy-making, but also with the respective policy dimens ion under investi gation. Policy expa nsion is most likely when European governance is based on compliance or communi cation, while dismantling effects are to be expected especially if EU governance follows the competition mode. Moreover, changes appear in general more probable at the instruments and settings dimension.
The following table gives an overview of our theoretical e xpectations on policy change. As our article has to be considered as a fi rst exploratory step to investigate so far neglected issues in the Europeaniz ation debate, our endeavor is far from encompassing. Rather our analys is indicates several issues that s hould be addressed by future research. Firstly, in our proposed approach to generating hypothese s for the individual governance modes, we had t o concentrate on a s mall number of variables. To a great extent, we wer e forced to neglect t he multi-faceted nature of national institu-tional arrangements, which from this and any other perspective dealing wit h the implementation of national polici es, exert a large causal infl uence. Yet in our view the next step, which "European" di smantling r esearch must take, lies precisely in the analytical integration of vari ous national structures and in stitutions of polic y implementation. Secondly, emphasis in future studies should be placed on the systematic empirical testing of the hypotheses developed in this study.
Regardless of these s hortcomings, our ana lysis emphasizes that EU-induced processes of policy expansion and dismantling should be system atically integr ated into the debate on changing forms of governanc e and policy-making in the European multi-level system. The changes in the nature of stateh ood triggered by the EU entail a substantial share of modi fication potential, which shoul d be tak en seriously. Without pinpointing and systematically explaining these different forms and directions of policy change, the research on policy-ma king and governance in the European multilevel system is destined to remain incomplete.
